Heavy alcohol consumption is known to be a major risk factor for disease and death globally. Various studies have related transmission of alcohol drinking habits with social contacts and peer pressure. Researchers have attempted to model this contact process through dynamical systems. Departing from this approach, this paper adopts a game theory model to study the transmission and prevalence of alcohol drinking habits, based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable population state. The proposed game theoretic model takes into account two scenarios. One deals with populations aged 15+ having two types of individuals: nondrinkers (N) and drinkers (D) whereas the other divides the same populations into nondrinkers (N), moderate drinkers (M) and heavy drinkers (H). In the former case, three types of pairwise interactions are possible between these individuals whereas in the latter, six types. The different possibilities inherent in these types are explained and the payoff matrices representing the interactions and the resulting gain expressions are presented. The game theoretic models are then analyzed and evolutionarily stable population states are computed for a few sets of parameter values. The advantage of this model is that it is found to be beneficial to understand the large time proportions of nondrinkers and drinkers in the population in a simpler manner than the dynamic system models. The work may be further expanded by dividing the existing classes of non-drinking and drinking populations on the basis of other critical aspects also.
| Published in | American Journal of Applied Mathematics (Volume 10, Issue 3) |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.ajam.20221003.15 |
| Page(s) | 111-117 |
| Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Game Theoretic Models, Evolutionary Games, Applications of Game Theory, Social Evolution
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APA Style
Gigi Thomas. (2022). Game Theoretic Approach to the Transmission and Prevalence of Alcohol Drinking Habits. American Journal of Applied Mathematics, 10(3), 111-117. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ajam.20221003.15
ACS Style
Gigi Thomas. Game Theoretic Approach to the Transmission and Prevalence of Alcohol Drinking Habits. Am. J. Appl. Math. 2022, 10(3), 111-117. doi: 10.11648/j.ajam.20221003.15
AMA Style
Gigi Thomas. Game Theoretic Approach to the Transmission and Prevalence of Alcohol Drinking Habits. Am J Appl Math. 2022;10(3):111-117. doi: 10.11648/j.ajam.20221003.15
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Download@article{10.11648/j.ajam.20221003.15,
author = {Gigi Thomas},
title = {Game Theoretic Approach to the Transmission and Prevalence of Alcohol Drinking Habits},
journal = {American Journal of Applied Mathematics},
volume = {10},
number = {3},
pages = {111-117},
doi = {10.11648/j.ajam.20221003.15},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ajam.20221003.15},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ajam.20221003.15},
abstract = {Heavy alcohol consumption is known to be a major risk factor for disease and death globally. Various studies have related transmission of alcohol drinking habits with social contacts and peer pressure. Researchers have attempted to model this contact process through dynamical systems. Departing from this approach, this paper adopts a game theory model to study the transmission and prevalence of alcohol drinking habits, based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable population state. The proposed game theoretic model takes into account two scenarios. One deals with populations aged 15+ having two types of individuals: nondrinkers (N) and drinkers (D) whereas the other divides the same populations into nondrinkers (N), moderate drinkers (M) and heavy drinkers (H). In the former case, three types of pairwise interactions are possible between these individuals whereas in the latter, six types. The different possibilities inherent in these types are explained and the payoff matrices representing the interactions and the resulting gain expressions are presented. The game theoretic models are then analyzed and evolutionarily stable population states are computed for a few sets of parameter values. The advantage of this model is that it is found to be beneficial to understand the large time proportions of nondrinkers and drinkers in the population in a simpler manner than the dynamic system models. The work may be further expanded by dividing the existing classes of non-drinking and drinking populations on the basis of other critical aspects also.},
year = {2022}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - Game Theoretic Approach to the Transmission and Prevalence of Alcohol Drinking Habits AU - Gigi Thomas Y1 - 2022/06/21 PY - 2022 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ajam.20221003.15 DO - 10.11648/j.ajam.20221003.15 T2 - American Journal of Applied Mathematics JF - American Journal of Applied Mathematics JO - American Journal of Applied Mathematics SP - 111 EP - 117 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2330-006X UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ajam.20221003.15 AB - Heavy alcohol consumption is known to be a major risk factor for disease and death globally. Various studies have related transmission of alcohol drinking habits with social contacts and peer pressure. Researchers have attempted to model this contact process through dynamical systems. Departing from this approach, this paper adopts a game theory model to study the transmission and prevalence of alcohol drinking habits, based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable population state. The proposed game theoretic model takes into account two scenarios. One deals with populations aged 15+ having two types of individuals: nondrinkers (N) and drinkers (D) whereas the other divides the same populations into nondrinkers (N), moderate drinkers (M) and heavy drinkers (H). In the former case, three types of pairwise interactions are possible between these individuals whereas in the latter, six types. The different possibilities inherent in these types are explained and the payoff matrices representing the interactions and the resulting gain expressions are presented. The game theoretic models are then analyzed and evolutionarily stable population states are computed for a few sets of parameter values. The advantage of this model is that it is found to be beneficial to understand the large time proportions of nondrinkers and drinkers in the population in a simpler manner than the dynamic system models. The work may be further expanded by dividing the existing classes of non-drinking and drinking populations on the basis of other critical aspects also. VL - 10 IS - 3 ER -
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