Corruption Impede Access to Public Health Services in Benin

Denis Acclassato Houensou; Fidel Saliga

doi:doi:10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12

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Corruption Impede Access to Public Health Services in Benin

Denis Acclassato Houensou, Fidel Saliga

Published in International Journal of Health Economics and Policy (Volume 4, Issue 3)

Received: 21 May 2019 Accepted: 29 June 2019 Published: 2 September 2019

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Abstract

Health care is one of the indispensable factors contributing to the improvement of productivity and the welfare of human capital. Indeed, most developed countries focus on improving the health status of populations. Despite significant improvements in the health status of human capital, there are disparities in equal access to health care. This finding is fundamentally linked to the structuring, organization and functioning of public hospitals in developing countries. The purpose of this article is to analyze the effect of corruption behavior on access to health care in public hospitals in Benin. The methodological approach adopted in this work explains the probability, for a user in contact with the health services of public hospitals, of developing corrupt behaviors [1, 2]. The estimation of selection model, based on survey data from users of public hospitals in Benin, shows that corruption behavior facilitates access to health care for applicant. But taking collectively, they slow down the normal functioning of health care services, create a congestion effect and increase the vulnerability of users of public health hospitals. In addition, the estimation results reveal a negative and significant effect between drug diversion and corrupt behavior on the one hand and the fact of not having social security coverage decreases the probability of developing corruption behaviors other. The study recommends, on the one hand, the establishment of surveillance mechanisms for public hospital actors and, on the other hand, an increase in penalties for corrupt behavior.

Published in	International Journal of Health Economics and Policy (Volume 4, Issue 3)
DOI	10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12
Page(s)	73-81
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2019. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Access to Healthcare Services, Institutions, Corruption Behavior, Congestion Effect Selection Model

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Denis Acclassato Houensou, Fidel Saliga. (2019). Corruption Impede Access to Public Health Services in Benin. International Journal of Health Economics and Policy, 4(3), 73-81. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12

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Denis Acclassato Houensou; Fidel Saliga. Corruption Impede Access to Public Health Services in Benin. Int. J. Health Econ. Policy 2019, 4(3), 73-81. doi: 10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12

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AMA Style

Denis Acclassato Houensou, Fidel Saliga. Corruption Impede Access to Public Health Services in Benin. Int J Health Econ Policy. 2019;4(3):73-81. doi: 10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12

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@article{10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12,
  author = {Denis Acclassato Houensou and Fidel Saliga},
  title = {Corruption Impede Access to Public Health Services in Benin},
  journal = {International Journal of Health Economics and Policy},
  volume = {4},
  number = {3},
  pages = {73-81},
  doi = {10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.hep.20190403.12},
  abstract = {Health care is one of the indispensable factors contributing to the improvement of productivity and the welfare of human capital. Indeed, most developed countries focus on improving the health status of populations. Despite significant improvements in the health status of human capital, there are disparities in equal access to health care. This finding is fundamentally linked to the structuring, organization and functioning of public hospitals in developing countries. The purpose of this article is to analyze the effect of corruption behavior on access to health care in public hospitals in Benin. The methodological approach adopted in this work explains the probability, for a user in contact with the health services of public hospitals, of developing corrupt behaviors [1, 2]. The estimation of selection model, based on survey data from users of public hospitals in Benin, shows that corruption behavior facilitates access to health care for applicant. But taking collectively, they slow down the normal functioning of health care services, create a congestion effect and increase the vulnerability of users of public health hospitals. In addition, the estimation results reveal a negative and significant effect between drug diversion and corrupt behavior on the one hand and the fact of not having social security coverage decreases the probability of developing corruption behaviors other. The study recommends, on the one hand, the establishment of surveillance mechanisms for public hospital actors and, on the other hand, an increase in penalties for corrupt behavior.},
 year = {2019}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Corruption Impede Access to Public Health Services in Benin
AU  - Denis Acclassato Houensou
AU  - Fidel Saliga
Y1  - 2019/09/02
PY  - 2019
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12
DO  - 10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12
T2  - International Journal of Health Economics and Policy
JF  - International Journal of Health Economics and Policy
JO  - International Journal of Health Economics and Policy
SP  - 73
EP  - 81
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2578-9309
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12
AB  - Health care is one of the indispensable factors contributing to the improvement of productivity and the welfare of human capital. Indeed, most developed countries focus on improving the health status of populations. Despite significant improvements in the health status of human capital, there are disparities in equal access to health care. This finding is fundamentally linked to the structuring, organization and functioning of public hospitals in developing countries. The purpose of this article is to analyze the effect of corruption behavior on access to health care in public hospitals in Benin. The methodological approach adopted in this work explains the probability, for a user in contact with the health services of public hospitals, of developing corrupt behaviors [1, 2]. The estimation of selection model, based on survey data from users of public hospitals in Benin, shows that corruption behavior facilitates access to health care for applicant. But taking collectively, they slow down the normal functioning of health care services, create a congestion effect and increase the vulnerability of users of public health hospitals. In addition, the estimation results reveal a negative and significant effect between drug diversion and corrupt behavior on the one hand and the fact of not having social security coverage decreases the probability of developing corruption behaviors other. The study recommends, on the one hand, the establishment of surveillance mechanisms for public hospital actors and, on the other hand, an increase in penalties for corrupt behavior.
VL  - 4
IS  - 3
ER  -

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Author Information

Denis Acclassato Houensou

Department of Economic, University of Abomey, Calavi, Cotonou, Benin
Fidel Saliga

Department of Economic, University of Abomey, Calavi, Cotonou, Benin

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Denis Acclassato Houensou, Fidel Saliga. (2019). Corruption Impede Access to Public Health Services in Benin. International Journal of Health Economics and Policy, 4(3), 73-81. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12

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ACS Style

Denis Acclassato Houensou; Fidel Saliga. Corruption Impede Access to Public Health Services in Benin. Int. J. Health Econ. Policy 2019, 4(3), 73-81. doi: 10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12

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AMA Style

Denis Acclassato Houensou, Fidel Saliga. Corruption Impede Access to Public Health Services in Benin. Int J Health Econ Policy. 2019;4(3):73-81. doi: 10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12,
  author = {Denis Acclassato Houensou and Fidel Saliga},
  title = {Corruption Impede Access to Public Health Services in Benin},
  journal = {International Journal of Health Economics and Policy},
  volume = {4},
  number = {3},
  pages = {73-81},
  doi = {10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.hep.20190403.12},
  abstract = {Health care is one of the indispensable factors contributing to the improvement of productivity and the welfare of human capital. Indeed, most developed countries focus on improving the health status of populations. Despite significant improvements in the health status of human capital, there are disparities in equal access to health care. This finding is fundamentally linked to the structuring, organization and functioning of public hospitals in developing countries. The purpose of this article is to analyze the effect of corruption behavior on access to health care in public hospitals in Benin. The methodological approach adopted in this work explains the probability, for a user in contact with the health services of public hospitals, of developing corrupt behaviors [1, 2]. The estimation of selection model, based on survey data from users of public hospitals in Benin, shows that corruption behavior facilitates access to health care for applicant. But taking collectively, they slow down the normal functioning of health care services, create a congestion effect and increase the vulnerability of users of public health hospitals. In addition, the estimation results reveal a negative and significant effect between drug diversion and corrupt behavior on the one hand and the fact of not having social security coverage decreases the probability of developing corruption behaviors other. The study recommends, on the one hand, the establishment of surveillance mechanisms for public hospital actors and, on the other hand, an increase in penalties for corrupt behavior.},
 year = {2019}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Corruption Impede Access to Public Health Services in Benin
AU  - Denis Acclassato Houensou
AU  - Fidel Saliga
Y1  - 2019/09/02
PY  - 2019
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12
DO  - 10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12
T2  - International Journal of Health Economics and Policy
JF  - International Journal of Health Economics and Policy
JO  - International Journal of Health Economics and Policy
SP  - 73
EP  - 81
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2578-9309
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hep.20190403.12
AB  - Health care is one of the indispensable factors contributing to the improvement of productivity and the welfare of human capital. Indeed, most developed countries focus on improving the health status of populations. Despite significant improvements in the health status of human capital, there are disparities in equal access to health care. This finding is fundamentally linked to the structuring, organization and functioning of public hospitals in developing countries. The purpose of this article is to analyze the effect of corruption behavior on access to health care in public hospitals in Benin. The methodological approach adopted in this work explains the probability, for a user in contact with the health services of public hospitals, of developing corrupt behaviors [1, 2]. The estimation of selection model, based on survey data from users of public hospitals in Benin, shows that corruption behavior facilitates access to health care for applicant. But taking collectively, they slow down the normal functioning of health care services, create a congestion effect and increase the vulnerability of users of public health hospitals. In addition, the estimation results reveal a negative and significant effect between drug diversion and corrupt behavior on the one hand and the fact of not having social security coverage decreases the probability of developing corruption behaviors other. The study recommends, on the one hand, the establishment of surveillance mechanisms for public hospital actors and, on the other hand, an increase in penalties for corrupt behavior.
VL  - 4
IS  - 3
ER  -

Copy | Download