The purpose of this study is to examine whether employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and CEO entrenchment affect social performance. Our central question: does employees’ participation in the system of corporate governance (shareholding and presence in the boards of directors and supervisory boards) influence social performance in the context of manager’s active behavior? One important result of the multi-varied analyses (logistic regression) is that on the whole employees, if they exert an influence on the determination of social performance in the context of non-financial French firms, are relatively powerless, on their own to explain this complex phenomenon. The findings contribute to explain the social performance and they have implications for firms that decide to engage in ESOP plans in French context.
| Published in | International Journal of Business and Economics Research (Volume 2, Issue 6) |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.ijber.20130206.11 |
| Page(s) | 116-129 |
| Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2013. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Employee Stock Ownership Plans, Board of Directors, CEO Entrenchment, Social Performance, France
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APA Style
Anis JARBOUI. (2013). ESOPs, CEO Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance. International Journal of Business and Economics Research, 2(6), 116-129. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20130206.11
ACS Style
Anis JARBOUI. ESOPs, CEO Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance. Int. J. Bus. Econ. Res. 2013, 2(6), 116-129. doi: 10.11648/j.ijber.20130206.11
AMA Style
Anis JARBOUI. ESOPs, CEO Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance. Int J Bus Econ Res. 2013;2(6):116-129. doi: 10.11648/j.ijber.20130206.11
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Download@article{10.11648/j.ijber.20130206.11,
author = {Anis JARBOUI},
title = {ESOPs, CEO Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance},
journal = {International Journal of Business and Economics Research},
volume = {2},
number = {6},
pages = {116-129},
doi = {10.11648/j.ijber.20130206.11},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20130206.11},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijber.20130206.11},
abstract = {The purpose of this study is to examine whether employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and CEO entrenchment affect social performance. Our central question: does employees’ participation in the system of corporate governance (shareholding and presence in the boards of directors and supervisory boards) influence social performance in the context of manager’s active behavior? One important result of the multi-varied analyses (logistic regression) is that on the whole employees, if they exert an influence on the determination of social performance in the context of non-financial French firms, are relatively powerless, on their own to explain this complex phenomenon. The findings contribute to explain the social performance and they have implications for firms that decide to engage in ESOP plans in French context.},
year = {2013}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - ESOPs, CEO Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance AU - Anis JARBOUI Y1 - 2013/10/20 PY - 2013 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20130206.11 DO - 10.11648/j.ijber.20130206.11 T2 - International Journal of Business and Economics Research JF - International Journal of Business and Economics Research JO - International Journal of Business and Economics Research SP - 116 EP - 129 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2328-756X UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20130206.11 AB - The purpose of this study is to examine whether employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and CEO entrenchment affect social performance. Our central question: does employees’ participation in the system of corporate governance (shareholding and presence in the boards of directors and supervisory boards) influence social performance in the context of manager’s active behavior? One important result of the multi-varied analyses (logistic regression) is that on the whole employees, if they exert an influence on the determination of social performance in the context of non-financial French firms, are relatively powerless, on their own to explain this complex phenomenon. The findings contribute to explain the social performance and they have implications for firms that decide to engage in ESOP plans in French context. VL - 2 IS - 6 ER -
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