Nowadays, we see everywhere in the world and particularly in Africa, revolts following elections. It is therefore important to find a voting method that represents consensus. It should also be noted that despite the votes, there are candidates who do not agree to recognize the results after their defeat. Faced with this situation, the ideal would be to find a good method that can result in less contrast. This is how the VMAVA method was developed. We notice that it is a good method because it fulfills good properties. However in the VMAVA method, we notice that the numerical applications have been made on voting situations where there are four candidates and five voters, sometimes four candidates and four voters, at most five candidates and seven voters. In our work, we are therefore interested in the implementation of the VMAVA method to facilitate calculations in voting situations where there are for example ten, fifteen candidates and ten thousand, twenty thousand voters. To do this, we have built two main functions, one which is responsible for choosing the elected candidate (s) on the basis of the total number of approvals and the other which makes it possible to decide between possible ties using the arithmetic averages of the candidates. Despite some difficulties encountered in this task, we have achieved quite interesting and concordant results.
| Published in | Pure and Applied Mathematics Journal (Volume 12, Issue 3) |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.pamj.20231203.12 |
| Page(s) | 49-58 |
| Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Vote, Voter, Candidate, Approval, Arithmetic Mean, Implementation
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| [5] | Nathanaël Barrot; On the computational aspects of voting by approval, Thesis defended on March 31, 2016 at Paris-Dauphine University. |
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APA Style
Koumbèbarè Kambiré, Zoïnabo Savadogo, Frédéric Nikiéma. (2023). Implementation of the VMAVA Method in Order to Make Applications with a Large Number of Candidates and Voters. Pure and Applied Mathematics Journal, 12(3), 49-58. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.pamj.20231203.12
ACS Style
Koumbèbarè Kambiré; Zoïnabo Savadogo; Frédéric Nikiéma. Implementation of the VMAVA Method in Order to Make Applications with a Large Number of Candidates and Voters. Pure Appl. Math. J. 2023, 12(3), 49-58. doi: 10.11648/j.pamj.20231203.12
AMA Style
Koumbèbarè Kambiré, Zoïnabo Savadogo, Frédéric Nikiéma. Implementation of the VMAVA Method in Order to Make Applications with a Large Number of Candidates and Voters. Pure Appl Math J. 2023;12(3):49-58. doi: 10.11648/j.pamj.20231203.12
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Download@article{10.11648/j.pamj.20231203.12,
author = {Koumbèbarè Kambiré and Zoïnabo Savadogo and Frédéric Nikiéma},
title = {Implementation of the VMAVA Method in Order to Make Applications with a Large Number of Candidates and Voters},
journal = {Pure and Applied Mathematics Journal},
volume = {12},
number = {3},
pages = {49-58},
doi = {10.11648/j.pamj.20231203.12},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.pamj.20231203.12},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.pamj.20231203.12},
abstract = {Nowadays, we see everywhere in the world and particularly in Africa, revolts following elections. It is therefore important to find a voting method that represents consensus. It should also be noted that despite the votes, there are candidates who do not agree to recognize the results after their defeat. Faced with this situation, the ideal would be to find a good method that can result in less contrast. This is how the VMAVA method was developed. We notice that it is a good method because it fulfills good properties. However in the VMAVA method, we notice that the numerical applications have been made on voting situations where there are four candidates and five voters, sometimes four candidates and four voters, at most five candidates and seven voters. In our work, we are therefore interested in the implementation of the VMAVA method to facilitate calculations in voting situations where there are for example ten, fifteen candidates and ten thousand, twenty thousand voters. To do this, we have built two main functions, one which is responsible for choosing the elected candidate (s) on the basis of the total number of approvals and the other which makes it possible to decide between possible ties using the arithmetic averages of the candidates. Despite some difficulties encountered in this task, we have achieved quite interesting and concordant results.},
year = {2023}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - Implementation of the VMAVA Method in Order to Make Applications with a Large Number of Candidates and Voters AU - Koumbèbarè Kambiré AU - Zoïnabo Savadogo AU - Frédéric Nikiéma Y1 - 2023/08/31 PY - 2023 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.pamj.20231203.12 DO - 10.11648/j.pamj.20231203.12 T2 - Pure and Applied Mathematics Journal JF - Pure and Applied Mathematics Journal JO - Pure and Applied Mathematics Journal SP - 49 EP - 58 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2326-9812 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.pamj.20231203.12 AB - Nowadays, we see everywhere in the world and particularly in Africa, revolts following elections. It is therefore important to find a voting method that represents consensus. It should also be noted that despite the votes, there are candidates who do not agree to recognize the results after their defeat. Faced with this situation, the ideal would be to find a good method that can result in less contrast. This is how the VMAVA method was developed. We notice that it is a good method because it fulfills good properties. However in the VMAVA method, we notice that the numerical applications have been made on voting situations where there are four candidates and five voters, sometimes four candidates and four voters, at most five candidates and seven voters. In our work, we are therefore interested in the implementation of the VMAVA method to facilitate calculations in voting situations where there are for example ten, fifteen candidates and ten thousand, twenty thousand voters. To do this, we have built two main functions, one which is responsible for choosing the elected candidate (s) on the basis of the total number of approvals and the other which makes it possible to decide between possible ties using the arithmetic averages of the candidates. Despite some difficulties encountered in this task, we have achieved quite interesting and concordant results. VL - 12 IS - 3 ER -
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