Social Security and Fairness in a Changing World

Dirk J. Wolfson

doi:doi:10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11

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Social Security and Fairness in a Changing World

Dirk J. Wolfson

Published in Journal of Public Policy and Administration (Volume 5, Issue 3)

Received: 7 May 2021 Accepted: 7 June 2021 Published: 16 June 2021

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Abstract

People are not alike. Hence, the basic difficulty in a democracy is that elections may determine the general stance of policy, but do not provide operational information on how to customize for diversity in the business of governance in a world that in changing after the crash-landing of covid-19. This background calls for a restructuring of social security, and introduces a situational mode of contracting that deals with asymmetric information in principal-agent theory when perspectives of suppliers and beneficiaries of public support may differ. Its core question is how to combine customized support for diverging needs, capabilities and employability, as recognized by caseworkers, with customized obligations on the part of beneficiaries, in co-production between civil servants and individual clients or their representative organizations. Situational contracts match demand and supply in social support throughout the process of public policymaking and delivery, and in horizontal relations with network partners as well. Inspired by recent findings from behavioral public administration, the situational mode deals with complexity in a consensual principal-agent model. This paper claims that there is scope for transaction as a tool to reveal, from the actual decisions taken, how we can match efficiency and fairness in a mode of situational contracting as developed below.

Published in	Journal of Public Policy and Administration (Volume 5, Issue 3)
DOI	10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11
Page(s)	62-71
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Diversity, Discretion, Complexity, Responsive Policymaking, Situational Contracting

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APA Style

Dirk J. Wolfson. (2021). Social Security and Fairness in a Changing World. Journal of Public Policy and Administration, 5(3), 62-71. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11

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ACS Style

Dirk J. Wolfson. Social Security and Fairness in a Changing World. J. Public Policy Adm. 2021, 5(3), 62-71. doi: 10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11

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AMA Style

Dirk J. Wolfson. Social Security and Fairness in a Changing World. J Public Policy Adm. 2021;5(3):62-71. doi: 10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11

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@article{10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11,
  author = {Dirk J. Wolfson},
  title = {Social Security and Fairness in a Changing World},
  journal = {Journal of Public Policy and Administration},
  volume = {5},
  number = {3},
  pages = {62-71},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jppa.20210503.11},
  abstract = {People are not alike. Hence, the basic difficulty in a democracy is that elections may determine the general stance of policy, but do not provide operational information on how to customize for diversity in the business of governance in a world that in changing after the crash-landing of covid-19. This background calls for a restructuring of social security, and introduces a situational mode of contracting that deals with asymmetric information in principal-agent theory when perspectives of suppliers and beneficiaries of public support may differ. Its core question is how to combine customized support for diverging needs, capabilities and employability, as recognized by caseworkers, with customized obligations on the part of beneficiaries, in co-production between civil servants and individual clients or their representative organizations. Situational contracts match demand and supply in social support throughout the process of public policymaking and delivery, and in horizontal relations with network partners as well. Inspired by recent findings from behavioral public administration, the situational mode deals with complexity in a consensual principal-agent model. This paper claims that there is scope for transaction as a tool to reveal, from the actual decisions taken, how we can match efficiency and fairness in a mode of situational contracting as developed below.},
 year = {2021}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Social Security and Fairness in a Changing World
AU  - Dirk J. Wolfson
Y1  - 2021/06/16
PY  - 2021
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11
DO  - 10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11
T2  - Journal of Public Policy and Administration
JF  - Journal of Public Policy and Administration
JO  - Journal of Public Policy and Administration
SP  - 62
EP  - 71
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2640-2696
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11
AB  - People are not alike. Hence, the basic difficulty in a democracy is that elections may determine the general stance of policy, but do not provide operational information on how to customize for diversity in the business of governance in a world that in changing after the crash-landing of covid-19. This background calls for a restructuring of social security, and introduces a situational mode of contracting that deals with asymmetric information in principal-agent theory when perspectives of suppliers and beneficiaries of public support may differ. Its core question is how to combine customized support for diverging needs, capabilities and employability, as recognized by caseworkers, with customized obligations on the part of beneficiaries, in co-production between civil servants and individual clients or their representative organizations. Situational contracts match demand and supply in social support throughout the process of public policymaking and delivery, and in horizontal relations with network partners as well. Inspired by recent findings from behavioral public administration, the situational mode deals with complexity in a consensual principal-agent model. This paper claims that there is scope for transaction as a tool to reveal, from the actual decisions taken, how we can match efficiency and fairness in a mode of situational contracting as developed below.
VL  - 5
IS  - 3
ER  -

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Author Information

Dirk J. Wolfson

Department of Public Administration, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands

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APA Style

Dirk J. Wolfson. (2021). Social Security and Fairness in a Changing World. Journal of Public Policy and Administration, 5(3), 62-71. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11

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ACS Style

Dirk J. Wolfson. Social Security and Fairness in a Changing World. J. Public Policy Adm. 2021, 5(3), 62-71. doi: 10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11

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AMA Style

Dirk J. Wolfson. Social Security and Fairness in a Changing World. J Public Policy Adm. 2021;5(3):62-71. doi: 10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11

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@article{10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11,
  author = {Dirk J. Wolfson},
  title = {Social Security and Fairness in a Changing World},
  journal = {Journal of Public Policy and Administration},
  volume = {5},
  number = {3},
  pages = {62-71},
  doi = {10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jppa.20210503.11},
  abstract = {People are not alike. Hence, the basic difficulty in a democracy is that elections may determine the general stance of policy, but do not provide operational information on how to customize for diversity in the business of governance in a world that in changing after the crash-landing of covid-19. This background calls for a restructuring of social security, and introduces a situational mode of contracting that deals with asymmetric information in principal-agent theory when perspectives of suppliers and beneficiaries of public support may differ. Its core question is how to combine customized support for diverging needs, capabilities and employability, as recognized by caseworkers, with customized obligations on the part of beneficiaries, in co-production between civil servants and individual clients or their representative organizations. Situational contracts match demand and supply in social support throughout the process of public policymaking and delivery, and in horizontal relations with network partners as well. Inspired by recent findings from behavioral public administration, the situational mode deals with complexity in a consensual principal-agent model. This paper claims that there is scope for transaction as a tool to reveal, from the actual decisions taken, how we can match efficiency and fairness in a mode of situational contracting as developed below.},
 year = {2021}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Social Security and Fairness in a Changing World
AU  - Dirk J. Wolfson
Y1  - 2021/06/16
PY  - 2021
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11
DO  - 10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11
T2  - Journal of Public Policy and Administration
JF  - Journal of Public Policy and Administration
JO  - Journal of Public Policy and Administration
SP  - 62
EP  - 71
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2640-2696
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20210503.11
AB  - People are not alike. Hence, the basic difficulty in a democracy is that elections may determine the general stance of policy, but do not provide operational information on how to customize for diversity in the business of governance in a world that in changing after the crash-landing of covid-19. This background calls for a restructuring of social security, and introduces a situational mode of contracting that deals with asymmetric information in principal-agent theory when perspectives of suppliers and beneficiaries of public support may differ. Its core question is how to combine customized support for diverging needs, capabilities and employability, as recognized by caseworkers, with customized obligations on the part of beneficiaries, in co-production between civil servants and individual clients or their representative organizations. Situational contracts match demand and supply in social support throughout the process of public policymaking and delivery, and in horizontal relations with network partners as well. Inspired by recent findings from behavioral public administration, the situational mode deals with complexity in a consensual principal-agent model. This paper claims that there is scope for transaction as a tool to reveal, from the actual decisions taken, how we can match efficiency and fairness in a mode of situational contracting as developed below.
VL  - 5
IS  - 3
ER  -

Copy | Download