Analysis of Medical Markets and Use of Mechanism Design Physician-Patient Interactions and Role of Organizations

Christine Claude Huttin

doi:doi:10.11648/j.stpp.20210501.13

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Analysis of Medical Markets and Use of Mechanism Design Physician-Patient Interactions and Role of Organizations

Christine Claude Huttin

Published in Science, Technology & Public Policy (Volume 5, Issue 1)

Received: 11 December 2020 Accepted: 8 January 2021 Published: 26 March 2021

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Abstract

This paper has been written after a seminar at the Soton business school (University of Southampton), discussing how market design mechanism can be useful for some medical markets, especially in combination with the reversed algorithm, called reversed conjoint model on physicians’ choices (Huttin, 2014, 2017); this first paper provides a description of two cases, one at the micro level of physician and patient interaction and a second one to integrate the organizational level of primary care groups. The first case is a micro representation of a physician-patient interaction, which can be expanded to integrate various types of heterogeneity of demand for care. The second case introduces the organizational level of primary care, with the example of the fundholding system; it leads to opt for a cooperative approach and to integrate variations between over spenders and lower spenders’ physicians. This paper uses the formalization of a game approach and proposes a stream of research for policy design in decision tools for financing reforms in health care. It explores how market failures in health care can be addressed with engineering economics and implementation of rules for different types of interactions in medical markets. Moreover, the limits to address the sources of heterogeneity between practices with tools such as yardstick competition may be addressed with the fast digitalization of the health system.

Published in	Science, Technology & Public Policy (Volume 5, Issue 1)
DOI	10.11648/j.stpp.20210501.13
Page(s)	29-39
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Medical Markets, Reversed Mechanism, Physician, Primary Care, Market Design

References

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[6]	Hurwicz L, Maskin E, Myerson R lecture on the foundations of mechanism design theory, Nobel Prize, Oct 2007, Nobel Prize foundation.
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[8]	Roth AE “ The economics of matching: stability and incentives” Mathematics of Operational Research 7 (4): 617-28, 1982.
[9]	Roth AE and Wilson RB How Market Design emerged from Game Theory: a mutual interview, Journal of Economic Perspective, vol 33 (3) Summer 2019: 118-143.
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Christine Claude Huttin. (2021). Analysis of Medical Markets and Use of Mechanism Design Physician-Patient Interactions and Role of Organizations. Science, Technology & Public Policy, 5(1), 29-39. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.stpp.20210501.13

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ACS Style

Christine Claude Huttin. Analysis of Medical Markets and Use of Mechanism Design Physician-Patient Interactions and Role of Organizations. Sci. Technol. Public Policy 2021, 5(1), 29-39. doi: 10.11648/j.stpp.20210501.13

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AMA Style

Christine Claude Huttin. Analysis of Medical Markets and Use of Mechanism Design Physician-Patient Interactions and Role of Organizations. Sci Technol Public Policy. 2021;5(1):29-39. doi: 10.11648/j.stpp.20210501.13

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@article{10.11648/j.stpp.20210501.13,
  author = {Christine Claude Huttin},
  title = {Analysis of Medical Markets and Use of Mechanism Design Physician-Patient Interactions and Role of Organizations},
  journal = {Science, Technology & Public Policy},
  volume = {5},
  number = {1},
  pages = {29-39},
  doi = {10.11648/j.stpp.20210501.13},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.stpp.20210501.13},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.stpp.20210501.13},
  abstract = {This paper has been written after a seminar at the Soton business school (University of Southampton), discussing how market design mechanism can be useful for some medical markets, especially in combination with the reversed algorithm, called reversed conjoint model on physicians’ choices (Huttin, 2014, 2017); this first paper provides a description of two cases, one at the micro level of physician and patient interaction and a second one to integrate the organizational level of primary care groups. The first case is a micro representation of a physician-patient interaction, which can be expanded to integrate various types of heterogeneity of demand for care. The second case introduces the organizational level of primary care, with the example of the fundholding system; it leads to opt for a cooperative approach and to integrate variations between over spenders and lower spenders’ physicians. This paper uses the formalization of a game approach and proposes a stream of research for policy design in decision tools for financing reforms in health care. It explores how market failures in health care can be addressed with engineering economics and implementation of rules for different types of interactions in medical markets. Moreover, the limits to address the sources of heterogeneity between practices with tools such as yardstick competition may be addressed with the fast digitalization of the health system.},
 year = {2021}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - Analysis of Medical Markets and Use of Mechanism Design Physician-Patient Interactions and Role of Organizations
AU  - Christine Claude Huttin
Y1  - 2021/03/26
PY  - 2021
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.stpp.20210501.13
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AB  - This paper has been written after a seminar at the Soton business school (University of Southampton), discussing how market design mechanism can be useful for some medical markets, especially in combination with the reversed algorithm, called reversed conjoint model on physicians’ choices (Huttin, 2014, 2017); this first paper provides a description of two cases, one at the micro level of physician and patient interaction and a second one to integrate the organizational level of primary care groups. The first case is a micro representation of a physician-patient interaction, which can be expanded to integrate various types of heterogeneity of demand for care. The second case introduces the organizational level of primary care, with the example of the fundholding system; it leads to opt for a cooperative approach and to integrate variations between over spenders and lower spenders’ physicians. This paper uses the formalization of a game approach and proposes a stream of research for policy design in decision tools for financing reforms in health care. It explores how market failures in health care can be addressed with engineering economics and implementation of rules for different types of interactions in medical markets. Moreover, the limits to address the sources of heterogeneity between practices with tools such as yardstick competition may be addressed with the fast digitalization of the health system.
VL  - 5
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Author Information

Christine Claude Huttin

School of Management, University Aix Marseille, Marseille, Aix en Provence, France

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APA Style

Christine Claude Huttin. (2021). Analysis of Medical Markets and Use of Mechanism Design Physician-Patient Interactions and Role of Organizations. Science, Technology & Public Policy, 5(1), 29-39. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.stpp.20210501.13

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ACS Style

Christine Claude Huttin. Analysis of Medical Markets and Use of Mechanism Design Physician-Patient Interactions and Role of Organizations. Sci. Technol. Public Policy 2021, 5(1), 29-39. doi: 10.11648/j.stpp.20210501.13

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AMA Style

Christine Claude Huttin. Analysis of Medical Markets and Use of Mechanism Design Physician-Patient Interactions and Role of Organizations. Sci Technol Public Policy. 2021;5(1):29-39. doi: 10.11648/j.stpp.20210501.13

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.stpp.20210501.13,
  author = {Christine Claude Huttin},
  title = {Analysis of Medical Markets and Use of Mechanism Design Physician-Patient Interactions and Role of Organizations},
  journal = {Science, Technology & Public Policy},
  volume = {5},
  number = {1},
  pages = {29-39},
  doi = {10.11648/j.stpp.20210501.13},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.stpp.20210501.13},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.stpp.20210501.13},
  abstract = {This paper has been written after a seminar at the Soton business school (University of Southampton), discussing how market design mechanism can be useful for some medical markets, especially in combination with the reversed algorithm, called reversed conjoint model on physicians’ choices (Huttin, 2014, 2017); this first paper provides a description of two cases, one at the micro level of physician and patient interaction and a second one to integrate the organizational level of primary care groups. The first case is a micro representation of a physician-patient interaction, which can be expanded to integrate various types of heterogeneity of demand for care. The second case introduces the organizational level of primary care, with the example of the fundholding system; it leads to opt for a cooperative approach and to integrate variations between over spenders and lower spenders’ physicians. This paper uses the formalization of a game approach and proposes a stream of research for policy design in decision tools for financing reforms in health care. It explores how market failures in health care can be addressed with engineering economics and implementation of rules for different types of interactions in medical markets. Moreover, the limits to address the sources of heterogeneity between practices with tools such as yardstick competition may be addressed with the fast digitalization of the health system.},
 year = {2021}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Analysis of Medical Markets and Use of Mechanism Design Physician-Patient Interactions and Role of Organizations
AU  - Christine Claude Huttin
Y1  - 2021/03/26
PY  - 2021
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.stpp.20210501.13
DO  - 10.11648/j.stpp.20210501.13
T2  - Science, Technology & Public Policy
JF  - Science, Technology & Public Policy
JO  - Science, Technology & Public Policy
SP  - 29
EP  - 39
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2640-4621
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.stpp.20210501.13
AB  - This paper has been written after a seminar at the Soton business school (University of Southampton), discussing how market design mechanism can be useful for some medical markets, especially in combination with the reversed algorithm, called reversed conjoint model on physicians’ choices (Huttin, 2014, 2017); this first paper provides a description of two cases, one at the micro level of physician and patient interaction and a second one to integrate the organizational level of primary care groups. The first case is a micro representation of a physician-patient interaction, which can be expanded to integrate various types of heterogeneity of demand for care. The second case introduces the organizational level of primary care, with the example of the fundholding system; it leads to opt for a cooperative approach and to integrate variations between over spenders and lower spenders’ physicians. This paper uses the formalization of a game approach and proposes a stream of research for policy design in decision tools for financing reforms in health care. It explores how market failures in health care can be addressed with engineering economics and implementation of rules for different types of interactions in medical markets. Moreover, the limits to address the sources of heterogeneity between practices with tools such as yardstick competition may be addressed with the fast digitalization of the health system.
VL  - 5
IS  - 1
ER  -

Copy | Download