Irrespective of the nature of a state, the issue of rent seeking remains ubiquitous. This paper assesses the prevalence of rent seeking from local governance perspective providing a focus on the major causes, forms and the efforts made in Adigrat Town. In so doing, the study has used both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies. Primary and secondary data sources were also utilized. Accordingly, the sluggish form of public services, lack of institutionalized practices, prevalence of mutual mistrusts, materialistic and self-centered motives, and embedded patrimonial relations have unleashed the practices of rent seeking in the Town. Bureaucratic corruption, lobbying practices, bribery, and actions of collusive interests were endemic forms of rent seeking prevailed in the Town. In connection, rent seeking situations where individuals negotiate over exclusive benefits and favor-seeking groups capture the public offices were common. Remedies of mainstreaming rent seeking as a public agenda, regular evaluation on performances, involvement of stakeholders in decision making, enforcement of legal measurement, introduction of ICT, and awareness creation were found too nascent. Thus, the respective public sectors should acquaint with anti-rent seeking strategies including meritocracy, party and government roles delineation, rebuilding the social capital, independent law enforcement, and delivering ICT-backed services.
Published in | Journal of Public Policy and Administration (Volume 4, Issue 3) |
DOI | 10.11648/j.jppa.20200403.14 |
Page(s) | 51-60 |
Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Rent Seeking, Corruption, Institution, Governance, Town
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APA Style
Teklie Tesfamariam Berhe. (2020). Political Economy of Rent Seeking in Local Governance: Causes, Forms, and Responses Towards (Evidences from Adigrat Town Administration, Ethiopia). Journal of Public Policy and Administration, 4(3), 51-60. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20200403.14
ACS Style
Teklie Tesfamariam Berhe. Political Economy of Rent Seeking in Local Governance: Causes, Forms, and Responses Towards (Evidences from Adigrat Town Administration, Ethiopia). J. Public Policy Adm. 2020, 4(3), 51-60. doi: 10.11648/j.jppa.20200403.14
AMA Style
Teklie Tesfamariam Berhe. Political Economy of Rent Seeking in Local Governance: Causes, Forms, and Responses Towards (Evidences from Adigrat Town Administration, Ethiopia). J Public Policy Adm. 2020;4(3):51-60. doi: 10.11648/j.jppa.20200403.14
@article{10.11648/j.jppa.20200403.14, author = {Teklie Tesfamariam Berhe}, title = {Political Economy of Rent Seeking in Local Governance: Causes, Forms, and Responses Towards (Evidences from Adigrat Town Administration, Ethiopia)}, journal = {Journal of Public Policy and Administration}, volume = {4}, number = {3}, pages = {51-60}, doi = {10.11648/j.jppa.20200403.14}, url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20200403.14}, eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.jppa.20200403.14}, abstract = {Irrespective of the nature of a state, the issue of rent seeking remains ubiquitous. This paper assesses the prevalence of rent seeking from local governance perspective providing a focus on the major causes, forms and the efforts made in Adigrat Town. In so doing, the study has used both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies. Primary and secondary data sources were also utilized. Accordingly, the sluggish form of public services, lack of institutionalized practices, prevalence of mutual mistrusts, materialistic and self-centered motives, and embedded patrimonial relations have unleashed the practices of rent seeking in the Town. Bureaucratic corruption, lobbying practices, bribery, and actions of collusive interests were endemic forms of rent seeking prevailed in the Town. In connection, rent seeking situations where individuals negotiate over exclusive benefits and favor-seeking groups capture the public offices were common. Remedies of mainstreaming rent seeking as a public agenda, regular evaluation on performances, involvement of stakeholders in decision making, enforcement of legal measurement, introduction of ICT, and awareness creation were found too nascent. Thus, the respective public sectors should acquaint with anti-rent seeking strategies including meritocracy, party and government roles delineation, rebuilding the social capital, independent law enforcement, and delivering ICT-backed services.}, year = {2020} }
TY - JOUR T1 - Political Economy of Rent Seeking in Local Governance: Causes, Forms, and Responses Towards (Evidences from Adigrat Town Administration, Ethiopia) AU - Teklie Tesfamariam Berhe Y1 - 2020/09/03 PY - 2020 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20200403.14 DO - 10.11648/j.jppa.20200403.14 T2 - Journal of Public Policy and Administration JF - Journal of Public Policy and Administration JO - Journal of Public Policy and Administration SP - 51 EP - 60 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2640-2696 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jppa.20200403.14 AB - Irrespective of the nature of a state, the issue of rent seeking remains ubiquitous. This paper assesses the prevalence of rent seeking from local governance perspective providing a focus on the major causes, forms and the efforts made in Adigrat Town. In so doing, the study has used both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies. Primary and secondary data sources were also utilized. Accordingly, the sluggish form of public services, lack of institutionalized practices, prevalence of mutual mistrusts, materialistic and self-centered motives, and embedded patrimonial relations have unleashed the practices of rent seeking in the Town. Bureaucratic corruption, lobbying practices, bribery, and actions of collusive interests were endemic forms of rent seeking prevailed in the Town. In connection, rent seeking situations where individuals negotiate over exclusive benefits and favor-seeking groups capture the public offices were common. Remedies of mainstreaming rent seeking as a public agenda, regular evaluation on performances, involvement of stakeholders in decision making, enforcement of legal measurement, introduction of ICT, and awareness creation were found too nascent. Thus, the respective public sectors should acquaint with anti-rent seeking strategies including meritocracy, party and government roles delineation, rebuilding the social capital, independent law enforcement, and delivering ICT-backed services. VL - 4 IS - 3 ER -